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The PARTY
game
It was the election of a 'disenchanted' electorate. Not for 
decades had so many voters given the major parties the 
cold shoulder. But why? David Burchell argues that 
some media and Left analyses were right offtrack.
Three years ago before the last federal elec­tion, in an article in Australian Society, 'Par­ties under Siege', I argued that the major 
parties were felt to no longer 'represent' their 
constituencies in the way they once had: "the ties 
of appeal between party and supporter had be­
come perilously thin". Certainly the place of the 
major parties as major parties was not under 
serious threat But what was a matter for serious 
discussion was that "what we are seeing at 
present is a serious bout of refashioning and 
realignment of the stuff of party politics in this 
country such as has not been seen in this country 
since the Second World War".
If the article raised interest in thinking circles back in 
1987,1 certainly never heard of it  Yet now the 'crisis of the 
major parties' has been the leitmotif of the entire 1990 
election campaign. One could be forgiven for thinking that 
the media had no other intellectual tool with which to make 
sense of events throughout the entire six weeks since mid- 
February. Feature article after feature article in the quality 
dailies reiterated the theme of 'disillusionment' with the 
major parties, almost as if that in itself sufficed as political 
analysis of the campaign.
There is little doubt over the level of unhappiness in the 
electorate over the choices it faced in this election . The 
0ft-cited opinion poll in the Sydney Sun Herald in the 
second week of the campaign which claimed that a third 
°f all voters were 'swingers' was a little dodgy - but the 
trend was unmistakable. Never since the days of the DLP 
^ad so few voters indicated their allegiance to one or other 
‘ the major party groupings. Where media analysis, like 
^ c h  analysis on the Left, went seriously astray was over
the origins of this disillusionment, its objects and its im­
plications for the party system.
In the first instance, both the media and large sections of 
the Left were oomplidt in a subtle slippage, an intellectual 
sleight of hand. For the hard Left the formula is a ritual: 
there is disillusionment in the electorate because there is 
no choice between the parties. Labor has become (or al­
ways was) simply a 'second capitalist party7, carrying out 
the bidding of multinational capital. Its reformist project 
(not that the hard Left ever supported that even when it 
was supposed to have existed) has been abandoned. This, 
we are told, is the politics of Tweedledum/Tweedledee.
It is worthwhile pausing to consider that the Coalition, 
had they been elected, were either publidy committed to 
or strongly implicated in all of the following: dismantling 
Medicare, privatising all significant public enterprises, 
privatising childcare, rerouting superannuation, gutting 
the wages system, mining Kakadu, cutting off the dole 
after nine months and winding back the small progress 
made by Aboriginal people these last seven years. This is 
not the stuff of Tweedledum/Tweedledee politics.
That image is an old theme on the Left. It had great 
currency during the Whitlam years (though few will admit 
to such sentiments now!), but of course even stronger 
sentiments were voiced during the Chifley years, and in 
the 'thirties, espedally by Communists. In every sig­
nificant period of Labor rule, in other words, some left 
critics have purported to find no real difference between 
the major parties. It could be said that sodal-democratic 
governments by their nature always disappoint: but cer­
tainly they always disappoint those who have, or daim to 
have, millenarian expectations of them.
As for the media, it had a particular sympathy with the 
cynidsmin the electorate-not least because it mirrored the 
media's cynidsm about the electoral process. To a large 
extent this is self-inflicted. The media has created the media
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caravan, the doorstop interview, the five-second grab, and 
now appears to feel imprisoned by its own inventions. 
Whatever may have been claimed in editorial copy, there 
was no shortage of issues in this campaign - though the 
structure of media commentary now is such that it is very 
difficult to highlight issues unless issues come, in readily- 
packaged form, from the parties themselves.
Again, the cynicism of the media, like that of the elec­
torate to some extent, reflected the complexity and often 
the drabness of the issues: interest rates which no-one can 
seriously claim to bring down by much, an intractable 
national debt and a highly complex wages policy debate 
hardly have the same ring as the Great Anti-Communist 
Crusade of Menzies in the 'fifties. But while the issues have 
become more complex, and the electorate more sceptical 
of economic 'quick fixes', media election coverage has 
tended to become much more electronically-centred, and 
thus almost inevitably more trivial. The paradox strains 
the fabric of electoral politics as traditionally understood.
However, while all of this may go some way towards 
denting some of the cosy orthodoxies currently abroad in 
the media and on the Left, it still fails to answer the 
question: why are people disenchanted with the major 
party groupings? And, more to the point, why both party 
groupings?
One part of the answer is clearly the spectre of 
diminished expectations. In the 'forties, each party could 
point to clear visions of the future which could be inferred, 
in shorthand form, from their political programs. For 
Labor it was a mixed economy with regulation and sig­
nificant public ownership, and a welfare state somewhat 
on the European model.
For the Liberal/Country parties it was the spectacle of 
economic freedom and opportunity based upon a 
humanised free market, as opposed to the 'socialistic' 
claims of its opponents. Of course, in reality Labor's 
achievements were less grand, and the Coalition mostly 
limited itself to managing the post-1945 compromise in a 
rather more conservative manner. But the dreams were at 
least coherent and credible, and in theory were able to be 
achieved within the life of a few parliaments.
The comparison with the political landscape of 1990 is 
stark. The major economic lesson of the 'thirties was (or 
seemed to be) of the ability of national economies to reflate 
in the teeth of global austerity and fiscal conservatism. The 
lesson of the 'eighties is of the virtual impossibility of such 
an occurrence today. And worldwide the grand claims of 
the Left and social democratic parties of the 'forties lie in 
tatters. The old regulatory regime of the 'forties, the old 
model of public ownership, the old welfare state model -
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all have taken a hammering in the last decade. And no 
radical and credible alternatives have taken their place.
At the same time the vision of the Right is more frag­
mented and ambiguous than it was in 1945, or even a 
decade ago. The New Right, that ghastly spectre of the 
'eighties, has in a few countries taken hold of the reins, but 
in very few actually taken hold of the agenda. Radical 
solutions from the Right seemed credible a decade ago, 
when national economies like those of Britain and the US 
were manifestly ailing and prime targets for a 'short, sharp 
shock'. But today, after the monetarist electrodes have been 
removed, the patient's condition seems far less radically 
altered than the Right had hoped. It is now a matter for 
debate in Britain, for instance, whether Thatcherism' ever 
really controlled the agenda in the manner then suggested 
by more forward-thinking elements on the Left And in 
Australia, as the Liberals' decision to retread Peacock 
showed, the radical Right prescription for the 'eighties too 
has taken a bit of a beating. „
On both sides of politics, then, there is a perceptible 
absence of overarching vision such as animated in par­
ticular the post-war years. Indeed, where such visions 
exist, on both Right and Left, they tend to go hand in hand 
with economic 'hard-thinking' rather than grand social 
ideals. Award restructuring and superannuation are not 
populist rallying cries. Nor, for that matter, are labour 
market deregulation' and 'microeconomic reform'. Of 
course, this doesn't signal 'the end of ideology', as recent 
revivals of the concept might claim: ideological as well as 
political conflict is alive and well. But its technical, even 
technocratic, expressions today hardly serve to embed it in 
the popular imagination.
This is in one sense what it means to say that the parties 
no longer 'represent' their constituencies. There was a time 
when, however fitfully, the economic and social program 
of Labor and the Left spoke to many people as being the 
natural program of an economic class. To others, the pro­
gram of the Right represented a supra-dass national har­
mony based on the right-to-rule of a homogeneous elite. 
Neither of these propositions makes much sense today. 
Whatever daims sodalism had to be the 'natural' cause of 
'the working class' lost its last shred of credibility with the 
ignominious collapse of Eastern European puppet 
regimes.
Nor does 'Accord politics', with its national, hegemonic 
aspirations, look like the program of a spedfic and iden­
tifiable class - particularly when it explidtly involves res­
toring profit share at the expense of wages. In this climate 
the only thing ultimately ensuring that certain people be­
come 'natural' Labor voters (let alone 'natural' sodalists) 
is family custom or tradition. At the same time the Right 
seems more palpably than ever in the grip of particular 
'special interests': after all, not even small business (let 
alone the CAI or MTIA) can agree on backing a 
Liberal/National election campaign!
Of course, these trends are not exactly new. After all, it 
was the Whitlam government which first made a dedsive 
break with the dass-corporate politics of the old-style ALP. 
A^d the crisis of direction in the Liberal Party could at a
pinch be said to go back to the chaotic Holt-Gorton-Mc- 
Mahon years, when the party seemed tom between small-1 
liberalism and a rerun of Menzies-style conservatism. The 
Fraser years, that oasis in the unhappy last two decades of 
the Coalition, in retrospect look very much like a pale 
imitation of the Menzies years with the difference being 
that, rather than managing growing prosperity, Fraser 
managed industrial decline.
What makes the phenomenon much more acute today 
is the pervasive lack of conviction in the ability of any 
government to rescue us from the spectre of slow, drawn- 
out industrial decline, with its 'banana republic' accom­
paniments of falling living standards and marginalisation 
within the world economy.
In that sense the vote for small parties and independents 
and the Greens and Democrats was not so much a vote 
against the major parties qua parties, but against 
'government' itself. One strongly suspects that had the 
Democrats miraculously found themselves holding the 
balance of power in the House of Representatives after this 
election, and thus involved in the business of governing, 
their current popularity would fall correspondingly as a 
result. Likewise, a significant element in the appeal of the 
various Green electoral options at the present time is their 
perception as being 'outside the political system', and 
particularly outside the all-pervasive economic ground 
rules of debate.
To a large extent, then, the current political air of disil­
lusionment is negative in origin, and those on the Left who 
take it as a starting-point for radical advance will probably 
find themselves quickly disappointed. The fact that the 
electorate is unimpressed by the mainstream political op­
tions does not mean that it is about to leap into the arms of 
snake-oil salespeople either of the Left or the Right. But the 
present moment does have another, much more positive, 
face for the Left. Who would have thought ten years ago, 
for instance, that we would see an election fought out over 
the terrain of childcare and green politics?
That a dear plurality of voters believes the environment 
to be the most significant issue at the present time in itself 
suggests that the political tide has turned rather strongly 
from the exceedingly narrow economic agenda of the last 
decade. Rather than arguing for 'more and bigger* from a 
relatively static economic cake, the Left might do better to 
focus on widening this agenda further. If the economic 
debate can embrace environmental sustainability, for in­
stance, why can it not incorporate the economic and ter­
ritorial needs of Aboriginal people (as it has, for instance, 
for Maori people in New Zealand)?
On the whole, the prospect for progressive causes seems 
brighter now than after any of the previous three elections 
of the Hawke era. That this is not paying dividends for the 
Left suggests that perhaps the Left has not yet freed itself 
suff idently from the straitjacket of a previous era. It should 
not mean that we need subside into despondency and 
despair. Nor, for that matter, should it lead us to seek 
succour from the prevailing disenchantment with the 
political process - a disenchantment which ultimately can 
only bode ill for any democratic project.
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